Inside Myanmar’s Scam Compounds: Forced Labour, Fraud, and the Rise of a Global Crime Economy

Wide-angle night scene of a fortified compound. A concrete guard tower with a small lookout hut rises above high perimeter walls topped with barbed wire. Bright floodlights cast stark beams across the compound yard

A whispered phone call cuts through the static: “I swear to God I need help.”

The caller was Mike, an Ethiopian trapped with 450 others inside a compound on Myanmar’s border with Thailand. He had been promised a good job requiring only English and typing skills. Instead, he was trafficked into a fortified city run by a criminal syndicate: perimeter fences, watchtowers, armed checkpoints, and border walls designed not to keep people out, but to lock thousands of workers in.

Inside these walled compounds, the conditions are as industrialised as they are brutal. Victims work up to 15 hours a day defrauding strangers online, under constant surveillance and the threat of beatings, electric shocks, or confinement in pitch-black rooms. Their passports are seized. Escape is impossible.

And yet, what makes Myanmar’s scam centres so startling isn’t only the forced labour. It’s the scale of the communities being built around them.

Fortified Scam Compounds on the Myanmar–Thailand Border

A new report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) shows that Myanmar’s scam compounds have expanded at an average of 13.5 acres every month since the 2021 coup. Many are larger than airports, with internal checkpoints, ferry crossings, and private security forces. Some even have dedicated infrastructure on the Thai side of the border, allowing smuggled workers and supplies to move with ease.

The Guardian recently revealed another layer of sophistication: compounds feature luxury housing for senior staff and visitors, complete with high-end cars and manicured grounds. These villas are sometimes used as the backdrop for video calls with scam victims abroad — a stage set designed to convince someone they are speaking to a wealthy investor whose financial advice can be trusted.

What emerges is a picture of entire criminal towns, with management living in luxury while trafficked workers are crammed into dormitories under armed guard. These are not hidden backroom call centres. They are militarised enclaves, sustained by a mix of Chinese syndicates, local militias, and the Myanmar junta itself.

A cinematic dusk scene showing the contrast inside a scam compound: in the foreground, a tall perimeter wall topped with barbed wire; beyond it, a row of modern luxury villas with balconies and parked SUVs.

While workers are locked inside dormitories, managers live in compound villas, sometimes used as backdrops to stage calls with victims.

Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Inside Myanmar Scam Compounds

Human testimonies reveal the cruelty of life inside these compounds.

  • Mike, the Ethiopian caller, described being trapped with hundreds of others along the Moei River border, forced into online fraud campaigns.

  • Ariyan, a young Bangladeshi man, told the BBC how he was ordered to bring in $5,000 a week. If he failed, guards subjected him to electric shocks or solitary confinement in windowless rooms. He survived and escaped — and has since returned to Thailand to try to rescue 17 friends still trapped inside.

  • Video footage smuggled out of these sites shows half-finished compounds deep in the forest, surrounded by barbed wire and armed patrols.

Victims are coerced into running “pig butchering” scams, romance fraud, and crypto investment schemes. Increasingly, they are forced to use AI-generated deepfakes — altering their voices and appearances to impersonate young women and lure victims abroad.

Myanmar’s Junta and the Scam Industry’s Role in the Conflict Economy

The scam industry in Myanmar is not a by-product of instability; it is a pillar of the junta’s survival strategy.

ASPI’s research shows that since the 2021 coup, scam centres have become an “existential lifeline” for the military regime. With natural resource rents and foreign investment collapsing under sanctions, the junta has leaned on militias to generate income through illicit economies. Scam profits keep these armed groups loyal, ensuring the junta’s grip on parts of the country.

The Global Organized Crime Index now ranks Myanmar first in the world for criminality, driven by state-embedded actors, foreign syndicates, and local militias. Cyber scams, human trafficking, and online gambling sit alongside narcotics and jade mining as core revenue streams.

In this sense, Myanmar’s scam compounds are not rogue actors operating in the shadows. They are a state-enabled industry, woven into the political economy of conflict.

KK Park compound on the Thai-Myanmar border. The left image was taken on February 18, 2020, and the right on January 17, 2024. Image: Maxar Technologies provided by European Space Imaging.

Global Costs of Myanmar’s Scam Compounds: Fraud, Tourism, and Victims Worldwide

The numbers are staggering.

  • ASPI estimates global losses from scam operations at $64 billion in 2023.

  • The UN puts the cost at nearly $40 billion in East and Southeast Asia alone. According to Chainalysis, pig butchering scams grew nearly 40% year-on-year in 2024, showing how the industry continues to expand despite crackdowns 

  • More than 100,000 people are thought to be trafficked into forced scam labour across Myanmar.

The victims are global: Americans falling for crypto-investment frauds, Middle Eastern men lured into fake online relationships, Europeans drawn into fictitious trading platforms.

Even Thailand — once a hub for tourism from China and East Asia — is losing visitors as trafficking fears make headlines. Local businesses report cancellations from travellers wary of being kidnapped or scammed.

And when scam workers are freed, another crisis begins. Thailand has expressed concern about hosting thousands of rescued people with no homes, money, or passports. As the BBC reported, some African governments say they will only repatriate citizens if another state covers the cost. That leaves victims stranded — traumatised, destitute, and stateless.

How Technology, Syndicates, and Border Networks Enable Scam Compounds

Technology and logistics networks sustain the industry.

  • Thai police recently intercepted 38 packages of Starlink satellite dishes suspected to be bound for scam compounds. Starlink connectivity allows operators to stay online even when local power grids are cut.

  • Criminal groups own land and warehouses on the Thai side of the border, enabling private ferries and smuggling routes into Myanmar.

  • Chinese syndicates supply capital, management, and global connections — while Myanmar’s military and Border Guard Forces provide protection.

This is what makes the industry so hard to dismantle: it is not just criminal. It is paramilitary, transnational, and infrastructural.

KK Park compound on the Thai-Myanmar border. Image: Stefan Czimmek.

Sanctions and Crackdowns on Myanmar’s Scam Industry

Governments are beginning to respond.

  • The United States Treasury has sanctioned Myanmar militias and companies linked to scam operations, including the powerful Karen Border Guard Force.

  • China, after the 2023 “Crouching Tiger” massacre in Laukkai, forced militias on its border to dismantle scam hubs, repatriating thousands of Chinese victims.

  • Thailand has restricted power supplies to some compounds and stepped up border raids.

But as ASPI warns, the scam industry is highly adaptive. Crackdowns in one area push operators deeper into Myanmar’s interior, where they set up new facilities in Mandalay, Yangon, and Shan State. The compounds don’t need casinos or city blocks — just an office, internet, and permissive local authorities.

Policy and Compliance Responses to Myanmar’s Scam Compounds

The ASPI report is clear: bilateral engagement with Myanmar’s junta will not work. Scam centres are an existential necessity for the regime. Instead, dismantling the industry requires:

  • Engagement with opposition actors such as the National Unity Government and the Karen National Union, who have already dismantled scam centres in areas they control.

  • Cross-border enforcement to target logistics, property, and laundering networks in Thailand and beyond.

  • Financial vigilance from banks, fintechs, and regulators, tracing flows linked to scam hubs and shutting down laundering pipelines.

For compliance professionals, this is a wake-up call. Scam compounds don’t just generate fraud; they launder proceeds through global banking, fintech, and crypto networks. Every suspicious transaction, every flagged account, could be a thread leading back to these fortified enclaves.

A modern, unbranded satellite internet terminal — a slim, rectangular white panel on a simple tripod stand — mounted on the flat rooftop of a modest industrial building inside a walled compound.

Satellite internet terminals on compound rooftops provide constant connectivity for scam operations, even in remote border zones.

Compliance Lessons from Myanmar’s Scam Compounds

For compliance teams, Myanmar’s scam centres aren’t only a humanitarian crisis — they are a reminder of how modern fraud economies intersect with financial systems worldwide. The billions stolen through forced-labour scams do not stay inside compounds; they are laundered across borders, disguised through multiple channels, and converted into seemingly legitimate assets.

Sanctions screening

Many of the militias and companies running scam compounds are already subject to international sanctions, including new U.S. Treasury designations in 2025. Financial institutions need to ensure their sanctions and watchlist screening systems are continuously updated to capture these entities and their affiliates.

Transaction monitoring

Scam proceeds often move through small banks, remittance firms, and crypto platforms. Monitoring rules should be tuned to capture behavioural red flags, including:

  • High-frequency transfers from new or lightly documented customers.

  • Inconsistent activity (e.g. a low-income individual suddenly moving large sums).

  • Multiple accounts funnelling into a single beneficiary that lacks a clear business purpose.

  • Repetitive payment descriptions that match known scam typologies (“investment,” “loan,” “crypto trade”).

Cross-border flows

Investigators have traced scam proceeds moving from victims in North America, Europe, and the Middle East into accounts in Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar, before being layered through remittance firms and crypto platforms. Compliance teams should be alert to:

  • Inbound wires from scam-exposed regions (e.g. East Asia, Middle East) into small institutions or money service businesses in Southeast Asia.

  • Rapid off-ramping into cash or crypto shortly after arrival.

  • Patterns of multiple small victim payments consolidated into larger cross-border transfers.

Reputational risk

Even indirect exposure to scam-related funds carries reputational and regulatory risk. Banks, fintechs, and money service businesses that fail to catch these flows may find themselves implicated in enabling organised crime — a risk that regulators are increasingly unwilling to tolerate.

Ultimately, the lesson for compliance is clear: follow the flows, not just the headlines. Scam compounds may be locked behind walls and guarded by militias, but their money is forced to travel — and that is where detection becomes possible.

Conclusion: Following the Flows

Myanmar’s scam compounds are not just a regional problem. They are one of the world’s fastest-growing forms of organised crime — a system that combines modern slavery, militarised infrastructure, and global fraud into a single business model.

The story of Mike, Ariyan, and tens of thousands of others reminds us that behind every scam transaction lies a human being — trafficked, beaten, and forced to work under threat. The industry will keep spreading as long as it remains profitable, protected, and politically essential to Myanmar’s junta.

For governments, regulators, and financial institutions worldwide, the message is clear: this is not just about cyber fraud. It is about a new kind of crime economy — one that launders its profits through banking, fintech, and crypto networks.

At Anqa Compliance, we focus on helping institutions detect and disrupt these financial flows — from sanctions screening to cross-border transaction monitoring, to free resources and training. Because stopping scam compounds isn’t only about rescue operations on the ground. It’s also about cutting off the laundering pipelines that keep this global crime economy alive.

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